How Safe?
What did waste giant
BFI find that made it run from the Adams Mine?
by Charlie Angus
HighGrader Magazine Summer 2000
As questions continue to dog Notre Development about the safety
of the Adams Mine proposal, opponents are asking why waste giant
Browning Feris Industries (BFI) dropped their option on the site
and high-tailed it away from the controversial project.
In 1996, Notre President Gordon McGuinty approached BFI as a possible
partner after Metro Works decided not to take over the building
of the site. BFI, with assets worth $9.1 billion, certainly had
the cash and expertise to build the experimental landfill.
According to a former BFI employee, the Houston-based corporation
paid Notre $500,000 as a preliminary option. The option was contingent
on BFI carrying out its own site inspection and analysis. According
to the source, BFI decided to forfeit the half million and get
out of the deal on the advice of its technical experts. The final
decision to walk away from the investment came from BFI top honcho
Bruce Ranck.
HighGrader's source identified Hugh Dillingham, then chief Landfill
engineer for BFI in Houston, Texas, as one of the men who ix-nayed
the project.
Reached at his home in Houston, Hugh Dillingham, who no longer
works for BFI, admits the company did drop the option.
"We decided it would be too expensive to operate (the Adams
Mine) with the necessary environmental controls we would have
to put in, primarily because of the groundwater infiltration.
We looked at the site and decided that the feasibility wasn't
there as a result of the technical challenges."
What separated the Adams Mine from conventional landfills was
the fact that it was situated deep in the water table and built
in fractured rock. Notre has always said this problem could be
solved with pumps. Under their plan, pumping and maintenance operations
would have to be maintained for upwards of a thousand years.
Dillingham says that BFI didn't like what they saw.
"We felt that what we would have to install by way of groundwater
removal systems would be a) too expensive to support a profitable
endeavor and b) it would create challenges down the line from
a maintenance point of view."
Dillingham says he doesn't know whether BFI forfeited the whole
half million dollar investment but acknowledges there were "some
non-refundable portions."
"We decided that technically it was a site that we wouldn't
care to deal with."
BFI's decision to walk from the project raises questions about
the ability of Notre to deliver a safe and competitive site in
the face of low-cost competitors.
The findings also seem to mirror another independent study of
the site done by Dr. Fred Lee of El Macero, California in 1995.
Lee's report was strongly critical of the reliability of the leachate
containment system being proposed.
In his report Lee wrote, "We recommend the public vigorously
oppose the approach being taken by Notre Development to the development
of this landfill as insufficient to protect the community's interests."
As well, Lee had sharp words for the hired consultants who were
maintaining there was nothing to be worried about. "It became
clear during our review that Metro consultants' statements on
how the landfill would be operated were deficient compared to
what would be necessary to operate this landfill in a true hydraulic
containment mode for as long as the wastes are a threat."
This issue of due diligence may become a legal impediment to Toronto
Councillors. Early in June, Owen Smith, a litigation expert from
New Liskeard, put all 57 members of Toronto Council on "notice"
for potential legal damages if the site should fail.
Smith sent each councillor a five-page letter outlining potential
oversights and shortcomings of the controversial project. As well
it set out the legal precedence for holding councillors personally
responsible if the pit should fail.
Smith is basing his claim on a ruling made last April by the Supreme
Court (ADGA vs. Valcom) which holds directors and principals of
a corporation personally liable for damages if it can be proved
that proper "due diligence" was not carried out.
Smith explains, "The decision says that you simply can't
rubber stamp what your corporation is doing. You have to take
steps to show that you at least made an effort to know those decisions
were right."
According to Smith, the size of the project and the risk involved
requires "aggressive risk management" to mitigate against
any future claims.
"If Toronto wants to rely on experts hired by the proponents,
they do so at their own peril. The one thing I've found from doing
civil litigation is that experts are notoriously inclined to go
in favour of the people who hire them. Toronto should make sure
that it hires its own experts before they chose to vote on it."
He says that if the project does go ahead he will be paying very
close attention to any faults the site may reveal.
"Having brought to their attention the potential problems
of this project, Toronto councillors can no longer plead dumb.
They have been warned and that warning should make them exercise
due diligence."
This article may be reprinted for personal use but any reprints
requires prior permission of HighGrader Magazine.