Introduction

For the last six years the district of Temiskaming has been embroiled in controversy over the Adams Mine Landfill Proposal. In 1990, the plan to use the abandoned Adams iron mine in Boston Township, probably seemed like the answer to Metro Toronto's garbage woes. Here was a site, far from an urban centre, with a supposedly "willing host." But from the beginning, hard questions were being asked about the wisdom of using fractured rock pits to store waste.

Any discussion about the Adams Mine proposal needs to take into account that the site was not selected because it had the natural advantages of a good landfill site, but because of its availabilty. Convential landfills are traditionally sited in clay but the Adams Mine consists of a series of huge open pits (some 600 feet deep and half a mile long) blasted deep into the water table. Numerous fractures run through the pits and the site is in between two major geologic faults. Former Adams miners say that the instability of the pit walls resulted in cave-ins up to 2 million tonnes of rock. While it is clear that large volumes of water pump into the pits at various levels, it is still not clear if the water flows through the fractures.

This last question is of vital importance to the rich farming belt south of the mine. The Little Claybelt agricultural region is dependant on water from deep wells fed from underwater aquifers. If contamination were to occur, the farming region could be devastated.

Initial support from residents for further work on the Adams Mine proposal came from a carefully worded referendum in the community of Kirkland Lake where residents were not asked to vote on whether they wanted the dump, but whether they wanted an environmental assessment done on the work being conducted by the proponents Notre Development. Temiskaming MPP David Ramsay has pointed out that many who voted "yes" did so because they believed that after the environmental assessment they would still be in a position to vote on whether or not they wanted the dump. It is clear that such a vote will not take place.

The public consultation process carried on by Metro (and recently taken over by Notre) has not answered the many questions asked by the public. In fact, the process has exacerbated fears, failed to address fundamental issues and has made many in the region cynical about the role of public imput on the Adams Mine proposal.

The proponent has from the beginning told the media and the public that all questions about the viability of the project will be answered. This, however, has not been the case. Questions raised by the Peer Review have received the same treatment as questions raised time and time again at public meetings. This document is an attempt to set out issues of technical concern regarding the site selection of the Adams Mine.

Brit Griffin

Chapter 1 - Landfills in Fractured Rock

Summary: The Adams mine was selected as a preferred site on the assumption it had a willing host. There is no willing host. Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the Adams Mine site is not the best site; in fact, many circumstances contribute to make the Adams Mine site a highly inappropriate site for a landfill.

1) The pits are situated in fractured rock. This alone makes it seriously deficient as a landfill site.

2) There are no natural features that make the open pits suitable for landfilling. All measures will be highly engineered.

3) The pits are blasted deep into the water table. No one knows where the fractures go or how large they are.

4) The site is located on a height of land high above the surrounding area; downgradient is a rich agricultural belt. The lack of expertise in the prediction of ground water flow in fractured rock creates a potentially serious risk to water supplies.

Landfills should not be sited in fractured rock, open pit mining sites. There are too many unknowns.

A. Siting a landfill in fractured rock

Since the initiation of the Adams Mine Landfill Proposal (AMSLP) citizens groups in the area have expressed grave concerns about the siting of a landfill in fractured rock. Consultants for the proponents have assured residents that the rock is essentially impermeable and that the special design of the project, the hydraulic containment design, will ensure that no leachate will escape through the fractures (see discussion of Design and Operations). The conclusions of the consultants that residents have nothing to worry about, however, are premature.

The peer review consultants requested information concerning the rate of flow of water through fractured rock. As well, the Public Liaison Committee requested that "...at some stage ...several fracture zones be selected and their hydraulic characteristics be established along their length and depth." (3).

This is key to ensuring that the landfill does not pose a significant threat to regional ground water, but information has never been supplied to answer this question. According to Andrew Piggott of the National Water Research Institute, the rate of flow in fracture is "...roughly proportional to the width of the fracture squared and to the hydraulic gradient. Fracture widths can vary over orders of magnitude, microns and millimeters, and therefore you can expect a wide rage of flow velocities. A reasonable value can only be predicted using site specific data. In many cases, ground water flow in fractured rock occurs through an interconnected system of fractures. This further complicates the prediction of ground water transport."(4)

The Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (Berkeley, California) have also stressed the importance of characterizing the fractures that determine ground water flow in "specific geologic settings":

"The characterization of these sites in order to predict the transport of contaminants can be problematic. The locations of fractures is often a mystery; their effect on flow can be dramatic. The fractures themselves may be leached by reactive waste material. Containment of waste may require the sealing of fractures. Thus, the three key issues that influence remediation of these sites are:

-finding the fractures that control fluid flow and transport

-analyzing fluid flow and transport in the fracture system

-predicting and controlling of induced or purposeful changes to the fracture system. "(5)

B. Drilling Program

Drilling around the pits has been very limited in scope. The hydrogelogical drilling in both 1990 and 1995 were confined to an area of about 1 kilometer around the pits. There were nineteen boreholes drilled in total - it is important to keep in mind that the pits are up to a half a mile long. With so few boreholes it is hard to derive any conclusive evidence concerning the nature of site specific fractures.

Initially, none of the boreholes went to the bottom of the pits. Pressure from the PLC resulted in a deep borehole being drilled under the South pit. In July, Golder stated that "this borehole will be followed by two holes drilled under the Central Pit and Peria Pit in 1996 to address the same issues raised with respect to these pits.....it is recognized that the proposed holes .. provide additional useful information concerning hydraulic conductivity, ground water levels, and ground water quality beneath the pits prior to any decision to proceed further with the project. "(6) As far as we know, this commitment has not been met.

There are other questions concerning the field investigation program. Gartner Lee, acting as peer reviewers for the PLC, raised questions regarding the ground water monitoring at the site. "One of the unusual aspects of the ground water monitors installed at the Adams mine are the extremely long monitoring intervals and screen lengths. A cursory review of the borehole records shows open lengths in the order of 30 to 50 m. The reasons for such lengths is not given, even though monitoring intervals at other sites are more typically 1 or 2 m when designed to monitor specific permeable features." (7)

and

"An omission in the field program is the evaluation of the shallow zone of higher permeability within the upper 10 to 15 m of bedrock. Golder indicates that the logging was not helpful in identifying individual flowing fractures there. There are very few monitors that exclusively screen this zone. The report rightly indicates that this zone will be more permeable than lower zones....It is therefore of critical importance to understand the extent, depth and hydraulic nature of such a layer in the event that the landfill engineering might fail and leachate reaches this layer. This is particularly true since it will be this pathway which connects the landfill to the surface water courses which will be the ultimate receptor of any potential contamination."(8)

Some area geologists have expressed concern that the two major fault lines in the area were not investigated. The Lincoln-Nippising Fault connects the aquifer -charge area to the north of Kirkland Lake with a farming area to the south. The regional ground water flow is north-south, placing the Adams Mine site between the upgradient aquifer and the agricultural belt. The Lincoln-Nippising Fault is not included in the regional ground water modeling cross-sections developed by the proponents consultants.

Drilling was commenced on the Boston Fault but was not completed due to drilling difficulties. Understanding the Boston fault is key to understanding the regional ground water flow.

C. Modelling Issues

The consultants working on the project used a modeling method suitable for homogeneous material like clay to predict the direction and flow of ground water. This is inappropriate to predicting water flow in fractured rock. The proponents consultants stated that "...based on past experience, the model (SEEP/W) produces reliable results as indicated by its recent use on the assessment of the Interim Waste Authority (IWA) Peel Region Site c-34b". (9) But as Fred Lee points out, the sites are not comparable. "It is my understanding that there is markedly different geology in these two regions. This could make this statement highly unreliable." (10)

Indeed, the National Research Program of the U.S. Geological Survey states that present theories of water transport through non-fractured media are of "limited usefulness": the theory describing these unsaturated zone influences has not been adequately tested and may in fact be nvalid for certain important cases. Limitations of present laboratory and field techniques are a major hinderance to large-scale hydrogeological application of unsaturated flow theory because critical physical charactertisitcs cannot be measured with the required spped and accuracy." (12)

As Gartner Lee points out "Heavy reliance is placed on the packer testing results but no discussion was presented on the applicability of the testing or analytical techniques".(13) This concerns echoes that expressed by the National Research Project of the U.S. Geological Survey:

"Since the description of fractured rock is highly dependent on the scale at which one chooses to observe it, it is necessary to develop mathematical models of transport phenomena in fractured rock under alternative conceptualizations of the medium". (14)

There is growing concern that the method used by Golder Associates to rationalize the hydraulic trap idea is seriously inadequate. After reviewing the internal drafts of the Golder Hydrogeology report, these concerns have been confirmed. In a statement at a Metro Environment and Open Spaces Committee briefing, Mr. John Davis of Golder Associates, said that they assumed the flow of water in the fractures to be similiar in volume to flow in solid rock. This has no scientific basis. Golder measures water flow through rock and assumes the water flows at the same rate through open spaces. This assumption defies basic common sense. Plate II shows the model SEEP that Golder employed to determine water flow. Based on the historical knowledge of the pit, the model leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, why are the sample holes beside the pit producing 50 to 100 gallons per minute, an amount that would produce more flow than Golder's calculation for the entire pit? If the water is not moving through fractures then why aren't all the drilled holes of equal depth with the same amount of water?

The SEEP model is only accurate, and can account for, only a small amount of flow in the pits. It is a precise instrument meant to measure water flow through solid rock and cannot assess the dynamic flow of water in fractured rock (see Plate III). The Golder modelling is static and gives a false sense of predictability. A more realistic account needs to take into consideration the interaction between water entering and exiting various fractures. The pits with the lower water levels have more down-gradient fractures taking water away. It is like having different sized drains at various levels.

Even Golder admitted in their 1990 report that "...ground water flow and therefore contaminant transport may be considerably more rapid along discrete fractures than is indicated by the rock's hydraulic conductivity." Yet this information is not addressed in the current report.

There is also concern regarding the data included in the modelling. As Gartner Lee points out, significant features have been excluded: "Lateral variation in hydraulic conductivity apparently has not been considered in the calibrations or subsequent simulations, and should be.

We superimposed the model sections by hand on Figure 6, to see if any of the faults intersected. At least six intersections were seen on only this one mapsheet. Further to this, the Lincoln-Nipissing Faults lies parallel to a portion of Cross-section A-A, and only 300 m away. The effects of these features should be modelled to determine if any unanticipated hydraulic conductivvity variations could promote failure of the hydraulic trap concept."(16)

Overlooking such significant geological features could prive disasterous down the road. The residents of Temiskaming want these concerns addressed thoroughly.

Chapter 2 - Hydrogeology

Summary: The hydrogeological studies of the Adams Mine site remain inconclusive. Since the Halton Landfill decision by the Joint Board and Environmental Assessment Board, priority has been given to finding a proper hydrogeological setting. The Board recommended at that time that hydrogeology of a proposed site be comprehensible and that monitoring for escaped contaminants be straightforward.

The Adams Mine site meets neither of these criterion. The drilling program was inadequate. The fractures have not been thoroughly identified nor measured. The fractures make effective monitoring difficult, if not impossible. There are too many unknowns at this stage to conclude that the site is suitable for a landfill. It will take extensive investigation and drilling, at considerable cost, to provide conclusive evidence on the site. "It is obvious to those who understand the elements of groundwater quality monitoring in the Adams Mine site setting that there is a need for a far more reliable groundwater monitoring program than that proposed by Metro's consultants. Notre has rejected our guidance and claims that the program is adequate. This is a clear indication that Notre does not plan to protect public health, the environment and groundwater resources."

-Dr. Fred Lee, Peer Reviewer

A. The drilling program

There are serious questions in the public's mind as to the adequacy of Metro/Notre's drilling program. Initial drilling was conducted in 1990, followed by more drilling in 1995. As mentioned, a total of only nineteen boreholes were drilled. It should be kept in mind that the area surrounding the pits is fairly extensive. As well, despite recommendations that drilling be conducted beneath the Peria and Central pits, this has not been done.(2) Conclusions from the regional ground water modeling are based on the limited drilling program, conducted only within 5 kilometers of the site, and existing geological information.

The consultants found that the most permeable rock was in the upper 15 meters or so. Given that the landfills will be filled above the ground level, these heavily fractured areas are susceptible to leachate leaking. The leachate could pool and flow down the mound of the landfill and possibly enter into fractured areas. It is important, then, to understand the subsurface flow patterns in this layer of rock. However, the consultants were unable to determine these flow patterns. In the Overview Document, Senes admitted that:

"Above 10 to 15 meters depth, it was not possible to provide a clear interpretation of flow from individual fractures or fracture zones based on fluid temperature and fluid resistivty log response .... the near surface rock (above 10 to 15 m) was typically fractured and shallow ground water was apparently flowing from fractures into some of the drillholes."(3)

Although this is critical information, it is difficult to determine given the limitations of current expertise in predicting flow in fractured rock (see Section II). Despite this, Senes suggests that the "... plan of ground water levels and flow directions for the active zone of ground water flow can be confirmed during later stages of the assessment..."(5) However, the public has been informed of no such confirmation or further investigations.

The unpredictability of ground water flow in fractures is evidenced by the results in four of the drillholes tested by Golder Associates. According to the AMASAP: Appendix F- Geology and Hydrogeology:

"For four of the drillholes (3,6,8,9) there were marked changes in the log response at depths of 36m, 50m, 58m, and 55m, respectively. This was attributed to ground water entering the drillholes in the upper 10 to 15 meters, moving down the drillhole, and exiting at permeable fractures or fractures zones at these depths."(6)

Clearly, then, there are fractures intercepting the drilling at various depths and carrying the water out of the drillhole. These fractures could then link up with a network of fractures. Who knows where the water finally ends up?

The Overview document claims that the hydraulic conductivity of "...the faults which intersect the pits is not appreciably different (with depth) than the surrounding rock mass. The hydraulic conductivity of off-site faults has not been evaluated to date. However, off-site faults outside of the area of hydraulic influence of the pits will not affect the model results for the proposed pumping and gravity phases of the landfills, since these fractures do not intersect the pits."(7)

According to peer reviewer Dr. Fred Lee, however, "...some of the strata, especially near the surface, have hydraulic conductivities of 10 -4 cm/sec. These values translate to ground water velocities of 10 to 100 feet per year dependent on the porosity of the media through which the water if flowing and the head (the difference in ground water elevation). This means that since the Adams Mine Site Landfill will likely be a threat to ground water quality forever, there is potential for substantial transport of leachate from the Adams Mine Site Landfill through the ground water system." (8)

Lee recommends that the modeling not just include the average rate of transport, but should also estimate the fastest rate of transport in order to establish a reasonable worst-case scenario. It should also be kept in mind that the fractures that intersect the pits could easily connect with off-site fractures at some point. These remain unknown, indicating that the conclusions drawn by Senes are overly confident.

B. Regional Information

Concerns were also raised regarding the regional geological information used by the consultants. In a memo, Dale Alexander (Prospector and Developers representitive on PLC), expressed concern about the quality of regional information used by Metro/Notre's consultants: "The most detailed geological site information presented is the 1957 map of Boston and part of Pacaud Twp. There must be better information than this from the mining operations or other more recent sources. From a regional perspective, geological information is very scant and again, maps are out of date - much more recent work has been done by Jensen et al in the 1970's and 80s." (10)

Gartner Lee also expressed concern that no references were given by Golder concerning the source of their information on the regional setting. (11)

As will be noted below, consultants did not notice an important geological feature in the existing information; the TFA had to bring it to their attention. Nor did they deal adequately with the two fault systems - the Lincoln-Nippising fault does not even appear on their regional mapping. The drilling program at the Boston Fault was abandoned before the drills even reached the fault due to soft ground.

C. Agricultural Interests

Since the Adams Mine landfill proposal was initiated, farmers in the Temiskaming Clay Plain to the south of the site have asked for assurances that their water will not be affected by the landfill. Their concern is grounded in the unpredictability of water flow through fractured rock. They have requested information concerning the water source that supplies the dairy farms. Thus far, the answers have been at best inconclusive, or worst, very confusing. As Dr. Fred Lee points out:

"Agricultural interests in this area are concerned that a major fault or fracture exists near the Adams Mine Site Landfill that could rapidly transport leachate to the ground waters that are used as a water supply in their area. While Metro's consultants assert that this situation does not exist, thus far they have not presented information that presents convincing evidence on this issue". (12)

Initially, the public was told that the water in the Clay Belt "probably comes from the rock...likely part of a large aquifer that is moving very slowly with an indication that it's a large, inter-connected system which could have flows that may move from the mine site to the Englehart area" (14) Within a couple of weeks they were told that the primary source of ground water re-charge is "direct infiltration of surface water" (15). A few days later they were assured that the Adams mine did not form an aquifer and does not influence any known aquifer in the region. (16) On Oct. 26, 1995 it was indicated that Senes Consultants now thought that the hydrogeological zone of influence of the Adams mine was only 5 km. Yet on October 30 at a Public Liaison Committee meeting , Mr. Gorber of Senes said "the problem is that the consultants had been attempting to give answers beyond the area of study. He stated that they only studied ground water within 5 km. of the site and that no technical studies have been done in the clay belt area as it is beyond their mandate at this time." (17) It is difficult then to understand how the consultants are able to conclude that the ground water of the clay belt will not be affected if they haven't studied the area. It is also easy to see how they conclude the zone of influence was only 5 kilometers because that is the only area they studied. (This restricted zone of influence has also meant that no baseline testing of area wells have been carried out because there are no drilled wells within that 5 Km. range).

In November 1995 Golder stated that they were "not aware of the actual presence, extent or characteristics of the Temiskaming aquifer." (18) This lack of information did not prevent them from then claiming that if such an aquifer did exist, it was not affected by the Adams Mine landfill. However, the consultants also seemed to have difficulty settling on a single definition of what even constituted an aquifer. In the Overview Document the consultants provide a definition of aquifer as "a saturated permeable geologic formation that stores ground water and is capable of yielding significant quantities of ground water to wells and spring" (19)

As peer review consultant Dr. Fred Lee points out, the working definition employed by Senes indicates that the Adams Mine does constitute an aquifer.

"Previously Metro and its consultants claimed that the Adams Mine Site is not located in an aquifer and is not hydraulically connected to one. This assessment is based on a different definition for 'aquifer'. If the definition of 'aquifer' presented in the draft Overview Document is used, then it would be concluded that the proposed Adams Mine Site Landfill is located in an aquifer and is hydraulically connected to an aquifer. There are wells and springs located in the region which yield ground water."(20

Local farmers found it difficult to accept that the high water demands created by the agricultural activities of the clay belt could be supplied by direct vertical infiltration (see Plate IV for a conceptualization of water flow based on community information). Evidence presented by consultants seemed both inconclusive and unconvincing. Dr. Fred Lee also expressed frustration with the fact that the Draft Overview Document did not address concerns expressed in his previous reviews: This is much the same material that was presented in the draft agricultural report which previously criticied. As discussed, the approach that was used (by Notre ) to determine that there wouldf be no impacts on agriculture is superficial and nadequate." (21)

Given on-going and vocal concern by regional farmers, a Ground water Workshop was held in December of 1995. Gartner Lee was asked to explore the regional hydrogeology of the Temiskaming Clay Plain. Their conclusions were that the Adam's mine site did not present a threat to the agricultural belt. However, their assessment was only preliminary and was conducted within a "...limited time frame in November 1995".(22). According to Gartner Lee , "No field confirmation through drilling or sampling was undertaken. Given the number of residents in the area (more than a 1,000), only limited landowner interviews were carried out with selected members of the TFA".(23) Therefore, the sources for Gartner Lee's conclusions were the 1995 drilling results by Golders, existing regional ground water documentation and limited interviews. It is not surprising, then, that at the ground water workshop, the Munroe esker was overlooked.

"It became clear from the workshop that was conducted on these issues in response to the inadequate review of these issues by Senes and the other consultants, that SENES et al had failed to adequately and reliably consider a potentially important mode of transport from the Adams mine to that area (the clay plain), namely the Munroe Esker. It is therefore inappropriate for Senes/Notre to now claim that a true worst-case scenario evaluation of the potential adverse impacts of farming interests to the south of the site have been conducted." (24)

Early drilling showed areas of loose gravel. Although the bedrock was described as impervious, and so the gravel clearly presented an inconsistency, no further investigation was carried out by the proponent's consultants. Information on regional ground water flow was obtained from a "...detailed assessment of the regional geology..." in the consultant's 1995 assessment. However, local farmers, reviewing the same material, discovered an esker just 2 kilometers on the east side of the pits. An esker is a geological feature composed of gravel which acts like an underground weeping tile. The Munroe Esker runs downgradient towards the clay plain.

Gartner Lee, in their May 1996 Temiskaming Clay Plain Preliminary Hydrogeologic Study, concluded that the Adams Mine does not represent a threat to ground water supplies in the clay belt. At the same time, however, they recommend further field testing of the Munroe Esker. As Dr. Fred Lee maintains: "Until this work is done, it cannot be certain that this esker does not represent a transport mode for polluted waters to reach the Little Clay belt is a fairly rapid manner. (25) "Notre has committed $250,000.00 to further study but the community has yet to be informed concerning particulars of the drilling program or results. (26)

The consultants maintain that an inward gradient exists throughout the pits, even at the bottom where they suggest the water flows up into the pits. This is what residents near the West County Marin Landfill in Point Station, California were told. According to Eugene Kojan, a mining engineer involved in a citizens group, residents were told at the outset that the water would flow up and into the bottom of the bedrock pit. But leachate escaped through the bottom of the pit. Leachate was detected 1 kilometer downstream from the landfill. (27)

They have been trying to pin-point the leak for six months with no luck. The West Marin Landfill is now closed, is facing up to $60,000 in fines and is trying to clean up before the owners go bankrupt.

In the event that the hydraulic containment design of the landfill fails, the consultants maintain that "...the results of hydrogeological modeling carried out (1995) indicates migration would be primarily through the upper, most permeable zone of bedrock (the active ground water flow zone) and would discharge to surface water within about 10 km. of the site".(28) They go onto claim the these surface waters, both Boston Creek and the Misema, act as transport-barriers in case leachate-polluted ground water escapes.

First of all, it needs to be restated that there are serious concerns about the applicability of the regional ground water modeling done by the project consultant. (see above) Dr. Fred Lee raised concerns about the SEEP/W model.(29) As well, as pointed out by the U.S Geologic Survey: "Limitations of present laboratory and field techniques are a major hindrance to large-scale hydrological application of unsaturated flow theory because critical physical characteristics cannot be measured with the required speed and accuracy". (30)

Beyond questions of the hydrogeological modeling, Dr. Fred Lee questions the assumption that the nearby Misema River and Boston Creek act as barriers to ground water transport:

"However, conditions are being reported where the so-called "river-barrier" situation does not, in fact, prevent the ground water from passing under the river into the aquifer on the other side."(31)

Dr. Lee raised concerns about the extent of investigation into this issue and suggested further study: " What specific studies, if any, have been done on ground water flow regimes that exist on with either side of and below the Misema River? It is my experience in having worked on similar problems at other locations, that a set of monitoring wells needs to be developed near, but on each side of the river, which are screened at various levels to determine the flow direction and magnitude at each level. .... Has any work been done to compare chemical characteristics of the ground water on each side of the Misema River?"(32)

Senes, in the Overview Document, reasserts that the Misema River or Boston Creek act as barriers but suggests that the ground water barriers "...could be confirmed by field investigations, if warranted".(33) It is difficult to imagine that confirmation is not warranted. Given that the river barriers are a key assumption in the containment of leachate-contaminated ground water under a worst-case scenario it is important to establish this beyond a doubt.

Dr. Lee maintains that the claim that the landfill will not impact agricultural interests is premature. "At this time, there is insufficient information provided by Metro and its consultants to justifiably claim that there are no major faults or fractures -pathways through the fractured rock that could serve as a fairly rapid conduit for leachate-polluted ground waters to reach wells in the Little Clay Belt area. This issue is the bottom-line issue that must be resolved with a high degree or reliability...."(34).

Sources for Hydrogeology

1. from correspondence from Dr. Fred Lee To Martha McSherry (REEPA)July 3, 1996, pg. 4-5

2. from memorandum from Golder Associates to Senes Consultants July 21, 1995.

3. Adams Mine Assessment Site Proposal- Appendix F: F5-1

4 "Borehole Geophysics as Applied to Geohydrology" National Researcxh Program,.U. S. Geological Survey,Contact Frederick Paillet.

5. see Adams Mine Site Assessment-" Response to Peer Review and Public Comments" Draft Technical Studies and Overview Document. March 1996. pg. 3

6. AMSAP Apendix F: 5-2.

7. AMSA- "Response to Peer Review and Public Comments" Draft TEchnical Studies and Overview Document. March 1996, pg.9

8. from Dr. Fred Lee. Review of draft report: Appendix F: Geology and Hydrogeology. November 14, 1995. pg.2

9. Mr. Stan Gorzalcynski. Letters to the Editor. Timiskaming Speaker, July 15, 1996.

10. Memorandum from Mr. Dale Alexander (Prospectors & Developers, PLC) to Mr. Joe Muething. Review of Appendix F: Geology and Hydrogeology.

11. from Gartner Lee "Preliminary Assessment of Appendix : Geology and Hydrogeology. November 27, 1995. pg.2.

12. Dr. Fred Lee Review of "Draft Overview Document" December 5, 1995.

13. Ibid.

14. Minutes of PLC Meeting #5, September 11, 1995. Larder Lake.

15. Memorandum from Golder's to PLC, September 298, 1995.

16. Memorandum from John DAvis (Golder Associates) to Senes Consultants, October 2, 1995.

17. Minutes of Meeting # 7, October 30, 1995. Kirkland Lake.

18. Memorandum from Golder Associates to Andy Pollock, November 15, 1995.

19. from AMSAP Overview Document: Glossary of Waste Management Terms. pg.5

20. see Dr. Fred Lee. Review of "Draft Technical Studies and Overview Document" December 5, 1995. pg. 18.

21. Ibid. pg. 17.

22. "Timiskaming Clay Plain Preliminary Hydrogeologic Study." prepared by Gartner Lee for Adams Mine PLC, December, 1995. Report commissioned by Nortre Development May, 1996.

23. Ibid.

24. see correspondence from Dr. Fred Lee to Martha McSherry (REEPA) July 3, 1996, pg. 5

25. Ibid. pg.7

26. Based on conversation between researcher and Gordon McGuinty, President, Notre Development.

27. Based on private phone conversation by researcher with Mr. Eugene Kojan of Point Reyes Station, Califonia. Also "Regulator defends dump controls" by Joel Reese, Poiunt Reyes Light Web Site.; "Landfill Critics dump on transfer station" by Michelle Ling, August 1, 1996.

28. Memorandum from Golder Associates to Andy Pollock, MetroWorks, November 15, 1995.

29. Dr. Fred Lee. Review of AMSAP- Apendix F:Geology and Hydrogeology. November 14, 1995. pg.3

30."Physical Characteristics that Determine Flow in the Unsaturated Zone" National Research Program, U.S. Geological Survey. (on-line abstract)

31. Dr. Fred Lee. Review of AMSAP:Appendix F. November 14, 1995. pg.3

32. Dr. Fred Lee "Review of Appendix F" Supplemental Comments. pg. 5

33. see AMSA "Response to Peer Review and Public Comment" Draft Technical Studies & Overview Document. March 1996. pg. 21.

34. see memorandum from Dr. Fred Lee to PLC. "Assessment of areas of concens in connections with December 5, 1995 Groundwater Workshop". December 4, 1995. pg. 3.

Chapter 3 - Design and Operations

Summary: The design of the Adams Mine Landfill Proposal is highly experimental. Hydraulic containment is not a common landfill design. Of the other hydraulic containment sites, many use liners for extra security.(2) Notre Development does not intend to use a liner.

Hydraulic containment should only be used in sites that are completely surrounded by the water table. This ensures an inward gradient. The upper section of the Adam mine site is not in the water table. As well, it is sited on a height of land 300 feet above the agricultural belt's water table.

According to the decision handed down by the Joint Board and Environmental Assessment Board concerning the Halton Landfill, natural containment is far more preferable to engineered solutions. The Adams mine site is highly reliant on experimental engineering, creating a high potential for significant groundwater contamination.

There are many flaws in the design and operation plans for the Adams mine landfill proposal. The monitoring method is not effective in fractured rock settings. The estimated contaminating lifespan is too short and the service-life of the components over-estimated. There is no plan to deal with leachate transport in fractured rock. The application of generic remediation plans that ignore site-specific problems leaves the proposed landfill open to disaster.

"As with other appendices, we have a fundamental concern regarding unsubstantiated statements or conclusions. Without backup or supporting data, our reviewers have often been unable to verify, check, or replicate results or conclusions."

- Gartner Lee Limited, Peer Reviewers (1)A. Hydraulic Containment

The primary design issue of the Adams Mine Landfill proposal is hydraulic containment. In the 1980s, Notre Development began searching for abandoned mine sites that might have potential for becoming landfills.(3) The rationale is that since the pits create af sink, there will be a constant inward flow of water.

This is supposed to occur because the pits are sunk into the water table. This alone raises grave concerns. Under normal conditions it is not advisable for landfills to be in contact with the water table. Since the safety of the landfill is dependent on an engineered solution, if something goes wrong, there are no natural features that would protect local ground water from contamination. As well, the Adams Mine site sits approximately 300 feet above the water table of the agricultural belt to the south. Hydraulic containment in a raised site is very different from one sunk completely into the water table.

As pointed out in the hydrogeology section, not enough is known about the flow of water into and out of the Adams Mine pits to ensure effect hydraulic containment. The hydraulic sink concept requires the pits to be below the upper sections of the water table. This is not the case with the Adams Mine pits which have an unsatureated zone at the top. It is important to note that this is the upper 15 meters is the most permeable section of rock. As soon as the landfill rises above the water table, then any natural inward hydraulic gradient fails. Hydraulic containment will require pumping to maintain the inward flow of water.

There were also some concerns regarding the economics of maintaining hydraulic containment. Gartner Lee pointed to the fact that Metro's consultants had provided no costing information on many of the proposed contingencies. Gartner Lee were unable to peer review the financial viability of the design plans.(4) Dr. Fred Lee agreed, commenting that: "...there are significant questions about ... Notre's ability to provide the funds necessary to ensure that the hydraulic containment approach will be maintained for as long as the wastes represents a threat."(5) and "It became clear during our review that Metro's consultants' statements on how the landfill would be operated were deficient compared to what would be necessary to operate this landfill in a true, hydraulic containment method for as long as the wastes are a threat."(6)

B. Pumping Phase

For the first 100 years the pits will be pumped to maintain the hydraulic containment. The first issue is the reliability of the pumps. During the operation of Sherman Mine (the sister operation to the Adams Mine), pumps would run 24 hours a day. In case of pump failure, water could accumulate quite quickly. At the public consultation meetings, miners stated that at times water would be pouring into the pits through the pit walls. If one imagines a landfill that is filled to the top with saturated garbage, even a short-lived pump failure could have significant impacts. Because there in no inward water pressure at the top of the landfill it is possible that water would start to move laterally out through the path of least resistance - namely, the heavily fractured rock at the upper part of the landfill.

C. Gravity Drainage Phase

Notre Development intends to shut the pumps off after 100 years and ground water protection will be dependent on a gravity drainage tunnel. The 100 year span, according to Notre, corresponds to the claimed contaminating life span of the leachate. (This hundred year estimate is contested by peer reviewer Dr. Fred Lee - see Section D below). According to peer review Gartner Lee, the "... design concept for the proposed drainage layers are presented with no technical support or justification. (7). Concern about the stability of the drainage blanket on the near-vertical pit walls was raised both by the PLC and the peer reviewer.

The proponent's consultants maintain that the drainage blanket would be supported by the waste, and that slipping and settling would not occur. Although this may be possible once the pit is full, what is going to prevent sloughing in the upper layers when the landfill is only partially full? As well, Dr. Lee believes a more rigorous examination of seismic activity should be conducted: "It is my experience, having worked with some highly competent geotechnical engineers on landfill side slope issues were there is the potential for seismic activity to result in unstable side slopes, that there is legitimate concern about the overall stability of the proposed drainage layer, especially under times of seismic activity. A critical review of the proposed design of this drainage layer could show there are significant questions about whether the design that has been relayed thus far is, in fact, stable. (9) This is an issue that needs to be resolved as the drainage blanket is key to the success of the landfill in the gravity drainage phase.

D. Contaminating life span

Dr. Fred Lee, after reviewing the support references for Golder's estimate that the contaminating life span is 100 years, states: "Upon review of these references, I find that they do not provide the information I need to be able to verify the contaminating life span for the proposed Adams Mine Landfill would only be about 100 years. If anything, some of the reference material indicates that some of the assumptions made in the modeling may be inappropriate." (10)

Peer reviewer Gartner Lee also expressed concern about the same issue, stating the "The fact that iron and zinc are listed as critical contaminants manes it very difficult to accept a contaminating lifespan of only 100 years. Further documentation is required...."(11). Yet the consultants are basing the decision to switch out of the pumping phase into the gravity-drainage phase on this estimate.

According to the Environmental Research Foundation, for certain inorganic materials (lead, chromium etc.) the contaminating life span is "essentially infinite", they never degrade or alter into anything other than toxic metals.(12)

Another area of concern identified by Dr. Lee is the assumed "relatively short half-life" used in the consultant's modeling. Dr. Lee felt the predicted half-life of ammonia was unusually short: "The estimated contaminating lifespan of this landfill is apparently based on the rate of decay - half-life assumed in the modeling of the concentrations of chemical constituents in the leachate. Of particular concern is the assumed half-like for ammonia, which at one location is stated to be five years and at another location is listed to be 10 years. It appears that a significant error has been made in estimating the persistence of ammonia in landfill leachate. This error could readily change the 100 years contaminating lifespan to many hundreds of years and possibly several thousand years."(14).

It is not re-assuring that Senes, consultants for Metro/Notre, decided on a 100 year contaminating life span when they admit that "...the leachate is expected to have concentrations of chloride that are higher than the ODWO value of 250 mg/L for about 2,000 to 3,000 years after landfilling for the South and Central Pits and 300 years for the Peria Pit. This is consistent with the (peer) reviewers opinion that this proposed landfill will be considered "polluting" from a water supply perspective for a thousand years or more. Because of the potentially elevated concentrations with respect to ODWO for persistent species such as chloride, the landfill has been designed such that leachate will not be allowed to escape into the ground water system." (15).

It has already been pointed out that many flaws exist in the design of the Adams Mine landfill proposal. Senes' intention to design a landfill that does not allow leachate to escape is not the same as proving that leachate will not escape. Given the findings of the Environmental ProtectionAagency (USA) that ultimately most landfills leak (16), Senes contaminating life span estimate may be wishful thinking.

E. Leachate Re-circulation

As is well-known, it can take a long time for garbage to break-down. Until it degrades, it poses an on-going threat to the environment. Peer reviewer Dr. Fred Lee questioned the proponents choice not to use leachate re-circulation as a method of speeding up decomposition. In fact, the proponents initially rejected leachate re-circulation outright on the grounds, according to Vic Morris of Senes, that leachate re-circulation prolonged the contaminating life span (17). The opposite is, in fact, the case.

David Carson of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("Full-Scale Leachate-Recirculating MSW Landfill Bioreactor") explains how re-circulation works:

"Concerns over the longevity of containment systems components present questions that cannot be answered without substantial performance data. ....A landfill operated in an active manner will encourage and control natural decomposition of the landfilled waste. This can be accomplished by collecting leachate, and re-injecting it into the landfill waste mass. Keeping the waste moist will lead to a largely anaerobic system with the capacity to rapidly stabilize the landfilled waste mass via physical, chemical and biological methods. The system has proven the ability to breakdown portions of the waste mass, and to degrade toxic materials at the laboratory scale." (18)

According to Dr. Fred Lee, it normally takes somewhere around 50 years for waste to stabilize, for the conversion of fermentable organics, but with shredded waste and leachate re-circulation, this can be reduced to 5 - 10 years. A report in Science News by R. Lipkin confirms Dr. Lee's contention. According to the report by environmental engineers F. Pohland and R. Landreth "...by re-circulating leachate...in a landfill, biological breakdown occurs up to 10 times faster than usual. "(19) Samuel T.S. Yuen, of the of the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Melbourne, agrees that "... the most investigated process-based management option is by leachate re-circulation." (20)

Later in the process, Metro's consultants changed their position, claiming they would allow vertical infiltration of water to keep the landfill waste wet by vertical infiltration of moisture but would not re-circulate the leachate. It is questionable whether the slow infiltration of precipitation will have anywhere near the same impact of a fully-financed leachate re-circulation program.

E. Service life of components

"It appears that Metro's consultants may have significantly over-estimated the service life of the key components of the leachate removal system. There is significant potential for blockage of this system that could impair the ability to maintain an effective hydraulic containment mode of operation that would prevent the off-site ground water pollution by leachate." (21)

According to the Environmental Research Foundation (ERF), leachate collection systems have only been in use since the 1970s.(22) Clearly, their long-term performance remains an unknown. However, it is well known that collection systems can easily become plugged; once plugged leachate begins to accumulate and once again, will seek the path of least resistance. In the case of the Adams Mine, the many fractures provide a transport path for contaminants. The ERF maintains that these systems can clog in less than a decade, (23) becoming plugged up .with silt, biological fouling, or clog because of growth of microorganisms in the pipe, (or) clog because of chemical reactions leading to precipitation of minerals in the pipes. Dr. Fred Lee raised this concern: "There is significant potential for blockage of this system by biological growths and chemical percipitation that could impair the ability to maintain an effective hydraulic containment mode of operation that would prevent off-site groundwater pollution by leachate." (24)

As the ERF has pointed out, little is actually understood concerning the slime build-up in leachate collection systems. As well, even "...if they were understood, we could not control chemical and physical conditions (temperature, pH etc.) at the bottom of a landfill because of the thousands of tons of waste heaped up in the landfill." (25)

The proponent is claiming that the use of large diameter pipes can help to mitigate these forces, but they will do little to prevent the action of acids on the pipe materials or the possibility that "...they can be crushed by the tons of garbage piled above them." (26)

There is also concern about the layer of stone above the pipes. Mr. Morris of Senes admitted that "the critical area is the fine layer above the pipes, but it would have to plug the whole perimeter of the pit before there would be a problem." (27) Later, in Senes' response of the peer review comments they state that "...biological clogging within the stone cannot be mitigated by regular maintenance and cleaning." (28) It is certainly possible that given the potential for clogging in the layer above the pipes, a good portion of the perimeter could become plugged.

The issue of service life of components was also raised by Dr. Fred Lee is regards to the gas control system. The consultants responded that the components would be designed to withstand the pressure and last for the requird lifetime of the landfill. This is not an answer, it is an assurance.

Gartner Lee also raises a similiar concern with regards to the perimeter collection system. "With repsect to 900 mm collection pipes in the perimeter collection system, the 'currently available, proven techniques' for pipe replacement have not been identified, discussed or justified." (29)

What the public needs to know is how the system will be designed to ensure structural integrity. We need actual information in order that it might be evaluated both technically and financially. We need to be told why the systems at the Adams Mine will be different from those at every other landfill which tend to degenerate with time. Since none of these systems have been tested for a period of 100 years, how can the consultants be so certain. According to Dean Wall and Chris Zeiss writing in the Journal of Environmental Engineering, the benefit of the leachate re-circulation approach is that it will "...diminish the overall environmental risks and impacts of landfills by actively stabilizing the easily and moderately degradable fractions of the waste stream while liner and leachate collection systems are in the best (newest) conditions during the first five-ten years of a new landfills life."(30)

There was also significant disagreement between Metro's consultants and the peer review consultant regarding the benefits of shredding the waste. Dr. Lee maintained that the shredding of waste was very useful in speeding up the decomposition of waste. Senes claimed it was unnecessary.

According to Lee, the shredding of waste is an important concern:

"This is an area that Metro needs to re-examine since it could be an important factor in influencing whether this landfill should be developed, especially in light of the MOEE regulations that require that the contaminating life span be less than the service life of any non-maintainable structural components for leachate and gas management. As long as the plastic garbage bags are allowed to remain essentially intact, the contaminating life span of this landfill will be determined to a considerable extent by the ability of moisture that enters the waste to interact with the garbage located in these bags, These bags will decompose slowly and could greatly extend the period of time the landfill gas and leachate production occur...."(31)

Dr. Lee also points out that problems could develop "...with respect to the garbage bags and daily cover establishing a barrier to vertical transport of leachate generated in the upper part of the wastes. This could result in breakout of leachate through the sides of the landfill into the highly permeable areas." (32)

The consultants claimed that compaction will have a result similar to shredding but Dr. Lee disagrees maintainng that there is no evidence that even state-of-the-art compaction equiptment can break up and compact the waste uniformly.

There are other concerns regarding compaction. According to a study conducted in Germany, the effectiveness of compaction depends upon the "... equipment used, the nature of the wastes and the placement techniques....Some wastes are easier to compact to high densities than others....This low density has lead to problematic leachate production problems because the waste allows very rapid channeling during high rainfall, so that leachate flow rates exhibit more extreme variability than at conventional landfills".(33)

It is also very important to know how much leachate the collection systems will have to handle. It is generally accepted that determining the amount of leachate is a critical design parameter when designing a landfill. The amount of leachate generated will impact operating costs for leachate collection and treatment. Gartner Lee, however, felt that it would have been "...helpful to provide an overall water budget for the site to allow the leachate volumes to be confirmed."(34) Without that confirmation, there is no way of checking suggested volumes of leachate, and therefore impossible to determine accurately the costs and design features necessary.

Dr. Lee also maintains that Metro's consultants "...underestimated the amount of moisture that would enter the landfill through cover." (35) Although it may be the case that increased infiltration will reduce the contaminating life span, as Metro's consultants claimed later on in the process, as Dr. Lee points out the increased infiltration places more strain on the drainage capacity of the collection system: "Their response that "Higher infiltration rates through the final cover would actually reduce the contaminating life span of the landfill...." is another of the superficial statements that was made throughout their responses. If the leachate system is plugged which prevents the removal of leachate and thereby its collection for treatment, then there is significant potential for pollution of the ground waters in the vicinity of the landfill and downgradient from it."(36)

Dr. Lee maintains that the consultants are remiss in assuming that the amount of moisture permeating the cover will remain constant over the contaminating life span of the landfill. Lee makes the following suggestions: "The increased moisture that will likely enter the landfill through the cover beyond the amount projected needs to be evaluated with respect to how it would impact the many components of leachate management discussed in Metro's consultants reports. Rather than allowing leachate generation in the landfill to be controlled by unplanned changes in the permeability of the cover due to cracks that develop in the low permeability layer of the cover, Metro may find that installing a leak detectable cover on this landfill and a deliberate moisture addition could be a significant asset in reducing the contaminating life span of the landfill." (38.)

.

F. Storage of waste at great depths

One of the significant unknowns in the design of the Adams mine landfill proposal is the operation of a landfill with great depth. Local citizens pressed consultants to find a similar site that could shed some light on the possible problems associated with storing waste at great depth. Consultants were unable to find a site as deep and admitted that operating a landfill at this depth was largely experimental in nature. "It is recognized that the placement of leachate collection pipes at these depths is unprecedented, and that further study is required to resolve detailed design issues" (39). The concerns revolve mainly around the tremendous build-up of pressure than occurs in the lower part of the landfill.

The example of the Marcopper Mine in the Philippines is a good example of the effect pressure can have on the mechanics of a landfill. (40) The Marcopper mine is a copper mine on Marinduque Island in South Central Philippines. In 1992 the mine was prohibited from discharging its tailings directly into the ocean and so decided to use the near-by Tapian open pit for tailing disposal. It was used for four years.

Unfortunately, the mine tailings were too heavy and exerted too much pressure on the concrete plug in the drainage tunnel leading from the pit to the river. On March 24, 1996 the weight caused a fracturing of rock around the plug allowing tailings to escape.

The mine had to be shut down while Placer-Dome tried to clean the millions of tons of liquid mine wastes out of two nearby rivers. According to Hugh Leggatt of Placer-Dome in Vancouver, the volume of flow has been reduced from 140 litres of tailings per second to 12 litres per second. They have spent $15 million to date on the clean-up and anticipating spending at least that much again. The Philippines government is filing criminal charges against the mine officials.

The stability of the pit walls is another unknown. Community members familiar with the site identified many occasions when the pits walls exhibit significant instability. Gartner Lee refers to a meeting with Senes were pit stability was discussed. Gartner Lee suggested at that time that "remedial measures may be quite expensive".(41) The build-up of pressure behind the walls can be quite strong, and community concerns center on possible damage to the drainage layer. Former Adams miner stated that pressure on the pit face resulted in cave-ins of up to 2 million tons of rock. This could cause significant damage to the draining layer which is composed of gravel. Damage to the drainage layer means leachate build-up and possible ground water contamination.

G. Leachate density

The proponents have stated that there will be no ground water contamination because hydraulic containment will ensure an inward gradient of water. This over looks a variety of factors. As Dr. Lee points out, the consultants may have overlooked the role leachate density plays in possible contamination. According to Dr. Lee, the model (SWEEP) employed by the consultants does not factor in leachate density. This is a critical oversight.

"Leachate which is appreciably greater in density than that of ground water, could serve as a sufficient driving force to overcome the low inward velocities that exist and allow leachate to pass through the aquifer system under the landfill and be picked up by the regional ground water". (43)

This perspective is confirmed by both Bear (1988) and Turcotte & Schubert (1984): "In the environmental context, waste fluid containing contaminants may spread through the water table. If the density of this fluid is different from that of the surrounding ground water, then the contaminants may propagate as a gravity current through the porous network of aquifers."(44)

The understanding of these gravity-driven substances is limited in two ways. The first is how the fluids mix with the water and other liquid substances they encounter. According to Huppert and Woods writing in the Journal of Fluid Mechanics, if the fluids mix slowly "...then the fluids retain their identify for a considerable time and many of the resulting gravitationally driven flows admit similarity solutions, some of which, to our knowledge, have not been previously described." (45).

Leachate density could also effect the operation of the drainage blanket. Peer reviewer Dr. Lee states: "...thus the drainage gallery may have considerable problems collecting all the ground water due to the density of the ground water ...under these conditions there is no question that there could be significant downward component of movement of leachate-polluted ground water which could carry these polluted waters under the peripheral gallery collection system."(46)

Once these contaminants have moved out of the landfill, remediation becomes very difficult.

"Many highly toxic contaminants commonly found in the subsurface occur as slightly soluble and highly volatile fluids, immiscible with water. Despite their low solubility, these compounds post a widespread potential threat to ground-water resources. Such fluids include synthetic organic compounds such as trichlorethylene (TCE) and related chlorinated hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, coal tar and creosote wastes, as well as natural and refined hydrocarbons. Due to the limited knowledge concerning the multiphase nature of transport of such contaminants in the subsurface, the development of methodologies for predicting the controlling the movement of removal of such plumes is still in its infancy." (47)

Under traditional landfilling conditions, the chemicals contaminants escaping from the pit will undergo natural attenuation in the clay. Most heavy metals, such as lead, arsenic and cadium, will be absorbed and retained by the clay soil as the leachate moves slowly through it. This will not be the case at the Adams Mine site where chemical contaminants will be escaping directly into unsaturated fractures.

Proponents have claimed that given the long distances that the contaminants must travel, that dilution will render the contaminants non-hazardous. Although this may provide some attenuation, "... it should be noted that the total quantity or weight of contaminants moving in the ground water system is not changed by this mechanism; only the concentration is reduced by mixing with more water. If at some later time it is determined that a contaminant is detrimental to ground water quality the spreading out of the contaminant over a large area may result in it being impractical to recover the contaminant by remedial action measures."(48)

H. Fickean diffusion

Another consideration raised by Dr. Fred Lee is the possibility that chemical contaminants might escape the hydraulic containment by Fickean diffusion. Cherry , Johnson and Pankanow, writing in the Environmental Science and Technology describe fickean diffusion: "All molecules are in constant motion; this motion is what we call heat. Hotter molecules are moving more rapidly than cooler molecules. Due to the motion of heat, molecules tend to move from a more concentrated chemical solution to a less concentrated chemical solution. As a consequence of this, the concentrated chemicals inside a landfill tend to move through the bottom clay liner even if there is no pressure pushing them downward."(50)

In the case of the proposed design for the Adams mine landfill, this is even more of a concern. Lacking any liner at all, the hydraulic containment method offers no protection from this form of contaminant transport.

I. Monitoring Systems

Dr. Lee expressed serious concerns about the efficacy of the proposed ground water monitoring systems. Dr. Lee maintained that there was a high possibility that the leachate pollution of groundwater would not occur as a traditional large plume, but instead as narrow plumes. These narrow plumes could easily pass between monitoring wells and not be detected. Dr. Lee did not believe that Metro had a sound approach to monitoring for leachate in fractured rock:

"The information provided on Metro's proposed approach for groundwater quality monitoring is nebulous and inadequate. Because of the great difficulties in reliably monitoring leachate-polluted groundwaters in fractured rcck systems of the type that exist near the proposed Adams mine Site Landfill, it will be necessary for Metro to develop a groundwater monitoring approach that provides a highly defined degree of reliability of detecting leachate-polluted groundwaters that exist under the Adams Mine site property." (51)

Lee recommends a different approach to ground water monitoring using vertical monitoring wells: "This monitoring system would be designed to detect incipient (initial) contamination by leachate-derived constituents before significant harm is done." Lee goes on to recommend that this program should be carried out "effectively forever" on a quarterly basis."(52)

J. Remediation

Dr. Fred Lee has criticized the Adams Mine Landfill proposal for not developing a full worst-case scenario. According to Lee, a landfill applicant should be required to provide the following information in order to establish that they are prepared for plausible worst-case scenarios:

-detailed information on contaminated ground water monitoring/detection measures.

-detailed information on treatment for remediation

-the amount of funding that will be required to complete remediation

-a source of reliable funding for remediation efforts for as long as wastes in the landfill pose a threat.(53)

Notre Development, however, claims that there will be no ground water pollution and therefore developing detailed remediation plans is not necessary: "In the unforeseen event that equipment fails, remedial action/contingency plans ... designed to prevent pollution of ground waters will be implemented. These plans would negate any contamination of ground water or the need for treatment even under the worst-case failure scenario."(54)

The purpose of worst-case scenario is to assure the public that if ground water or surface water pollution should occur, the proponent has a reasonable plan in place to contend with the problem. By denying that there could be a problem, the proponent fails to provide a thorough approach to landfill management.

Dr. Lee maintains that in the case of ground water pollution, the landfill proponents must be prepared to empty the pits (landfill mining) if it is not possible to stop off-site pollution of ground water from escaped leachate. The proponents consultants dismiss this suggestion as not a "reasonable or practical proposition". Instead they suggest reverting back to the pumping system or the use of purge wells.

But according to the U.S. Congress's Office of Technological Assessment, "...a large body of scientific evidence has now accumulated showing that pump and treat does not work and -given today's knowledge - cannot work"(55) Pump and treat will be especially problematic in fractured rock as there is no way to determine where, how and how far the contaminated ground water has traveled. As the West Marin County Landfill example mentioned above demonstrates, once leachate has escaped into bedrock, it is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to trace the source. At West Marin County Landfill they had been checking for six months to find the source of contamination with no success.

Section III Notes

1. Covering letter from Bill Balfour, Gartner Lee Ltd, to Mr. Ron Yurick, PLC Chairman re: Review Internal Draft Document of Appendix B. November 30, 1995.

2. Information based on telephone conversation with Dr. Riley Kinman, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Cincinati. (513-556-3694) Dr. Kinman referred to a few hydraulic containment landfill sites he was familiar with but mentioned that as far as he was aware they had liners. It should be noted that it was difficult to find many examples of landfills operating on the hydraulic containment model.

3. "Historical Background - Adams Mine Project - Kirkland Lake - Ontario: Willing Host Development", prepared for Mr. Chuck Paulter, Director EA Branch, July 31, 1995. pg.1.

4. Gartner Lee Limited, Review of Internal Draft Document: Appendix B. November 30, 1995, pg.1.

5. Correspondence from Dr. Fred Lee to Martha McSherry (REEPA< Kirkland Lake) July 3, 1996. pg.2

6. Ibid.

7. Gartner Lee Limited , Review of Internal Draft Document: Appendix B, November 30, 1995. pg,2

8. Dr. Fred Lee "Comments on the Draft Overview Document"" Executive Summary. December 5, 1995. pg. 7.

9. Dr. Fred Lee, Review of Appendix F: Geology and Hydrogeology. November 14, 1995. pg.6.

10. Statement from Dr. Fred Lee to Public Liason Committee re: Grondwater Workshop. December 4, 1995. pg,2

11. Gartner Lee, Review of Internal Draft Documnet: Appendix B, November 30, 1995. pg.8.

12. Rachels' Hazardous Waste News #71, April 4, 1988. Electronic Edition. From Geraghty & Miller study (EPA 1977).

13. Rachel's Hazardous Waste News, August 10, 1987, Electronic Edition. From Federal Register of the Envrionmental Protection Agency, February 15, 1981, pg. 11129.

14. .Dr. Fred Lee "Comments on the Draft Overview Document" November 29, 1995, pg.2.

15. Notre's Responses to Public Review and Public Comments. pg. 43. March, 1996. Submitted by Senes and Golder Associaites.*

16. Rachel's Hazardous Waste News. #37, August 10, 1987. Electronic Edition. From the Federal Register, Environmental Protection ASgency, February 15, 1981.

17. Minutes of October 2, 1995 Public Liason Committee. Comments by Mr. Vic Morris, Senes Consultants.

18. Carson, David. "Full-Scale Leachate-Recirculation MSW Landfill Bioreactor" U.S. EPA. Cincinnati, Ohio (on-line).

19. Lipkin, R. "Test Landfills Percolate Bioreactors" Science News, Vol.146, 1994. pg. 151.

20. Yuen, Samuel. "An Active Landfill Management by Leachate Recirculation: A Full-Scale Bio-Reactor Landfill Research Project" Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Melbourne (on-line)

21. Dr. Fred Lee "Overview Assessment of Potential Public Health, Environmental and Groundwater Resources and Other Inpacts: Exceutive Summary" December 12, 1995.

22. Rachel's Hazardous Waste News #119. "Leachate Collection Systems: The Achilles Heel of Landfills" by Peter Montague. March 7, 1981. pg. 2.. Draft Overview Document. Section ****

23 Ibid.

24. Dr. Fred Lee, "Overview Assessment: Executive Summarey" December 12, 1995. pg.2.

25. Rachel's Hazardous News, # 119. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Memorandum from Mr. Alton (Senes) to Mr. Yurick (Chairman, PLC) October 27, 1995.

28. Draft Overview Document. Submitted by Senes. pg. B-49.

29. Gartner Lee, "Review of Internal Draft Document: Appendix B" Novmber 30, 1995. pg. 6.

30. Wall, Dean and Chris Zeiss. "Municipal Landfill Biodegradtion and Settlement" Journal of Environmental Engineering, Vol. 121 # 3 pgs. 214 -244.

31.Dr. Fred Lee "Review on Appendix F" November 14, 1995, pg. 4..

32. Dr. Fred Lee. Review of Appendix F. November 14, 1995. pg. 4.

33. "Landfill Techniques: Waste Emplacement Methods and Pre-Treatment" World Resources Fund: Technical Brtiefs. 1996. (on-line at Prism)

34. Gartner Lee, "Review of Internal Draft document: Appendix B", November 30, 1995. pg. 3.

35. Correspondence from Dr. Fred Lee to Marthas McSherry (REEPA) pg. 3.

36.

37. Dr. Fred Lee "Comments on Draft Overview Document" December 1, 1995. pg. 7.

38. Dr. Fred Lee, "Review of Draft Overview Document, December 5, 1995. pg. 8.

39. Draft Overview Document. Submitted by Senes, March 1996. pg. B-4

40. Information regarding the Marcopper mine tailings spill from ENN Daily News, June 28, 1996, (on-line). Also from telephone conversation with Mr. Hugh Leggatt, Public Relations, Placer-Dome, Vancouver, B.C.41. Memorandum from Gartner Lee to Senes Consultants, July 20, 1995

41.

42. Dr. Fred Lee "Review on Appendix F" November 14, 1995. pg. 3.

43. Dr. Fred Lee "Review of Appendix F" November 14, 1995. pg.

44.

45. Huppert, Herbert E. and Andrew W. Woods. (Institute of Theorectical Geophysics, Cambridge) "Gravity-driven flows in porous layers" Journal of Fluid Mechanics. Vol. 292. pgs.55-69

46. Dr. Fred Lee "Review of Appendix F" November 14, 1995. pg. 3.

47. "Fate and Transport of Immiscible Contaminants in the Subsurface" National Research Program, U.S. Geological Survey. (abstract on-line)

48.

49. Haitjema (1991) "Ground Water Hydraulics Considerations Regarding Landfills" Water Res. Bull. Vol. 27 #5 pgs. 791 - 796.

50. Cherry, John et al. "Diffusive Contaminant Transport in Natural Clay: A Field Example and Implications for Clay-Lined Waste Disposal Sites" Environmental Science and Tecnology. Vol. 23 pgs. 340-349. (as sourced by Dr. Fred Lee).

51. Dr. Fred Lee "Overview Assessment: Executive Summary" December 12, 1995. pg.14.

52.. Dr. Fred Lee "Supplemental Comments on Appendix F" November 14, 1995. pg. 4.

53. Dr. Fred Lee "Review of Appendix F" November 14, 1995. pg. 5.

54. "Response to the Executive Summary" February 22, 1996. by Senes. pg,8. (included in Response to Peer Review and Public Comment, March, 1996)

55. "Cleaning Up: Superfund Problems Can be Solved" (Superfund Study) Office of Technology, U.S. Congress, 1989. pgs. 151-157. (on-line).

Chapter 4 - Site Selection Process

Summary: As a site selection process, the willing host approach is seriously flawed:

1) There are no workable criterion established or agreed upon that can assist in the determination of willingness and,

2) The host region was determined by the proponent (Notre Development) based on concerns that have no relation to a rationale process of site selection.

3) Issues of 'affectedness' were not considered.

The Adams mine was selected as a preferred site because it was a "willing host" site. However, given the degree of local opposition to the proposed landfill it is reasonable to conclude that a true willing host community does not exist. Therefore it is extremely difficult to justify the selection of the Adams Mine as a potential landfill site.

"To be putting millions of tonnes of garbage in a fractured rock pit is absolutely ludicrous. It's a bad idea and it should never be allowed to happen ...if you don't let local people have a say on that, there will be wide spread civil disobedience throughout Temiskaming and I will be there on the front line as part of it."

-Temiskaming MPP David Ramsay, June 26, 1996 (1)A. Background

The Adams Mine Landfill site was selected as a potential landfill for Metro Toronto as part of their 1993 Willing Host Landfill Site Search. The Willing Host search was initiated while the Interim Waste Authority was still attempting to select a preferred site within the GTA. Public opposition was strong and Metro believed "...that this opposition, and the uncertainty surrounding the future of the IWA process, will make the successful siting of a York/Metro landfill unlikely"(2). In December of 1993 , 830 municipalities received willing host site search notification from Metro, along with First Nations and interested landowners. MetroWorks maintained that the Adams Mine landfill was the only site to emerge out of that selection process. (3)

There are, however, significant problems with the concept of willing host as applied in the Adams mine site selection.

B. Definition - there is no clear understanding of the notion of "willingness" nor of the determination of the 'host region'.

Metro's definition of willing host for the purposes of their site search:

1) a willing jurisdiction responsible for solid waste management (i.e. county, region) if different from the local municipal council, and

2) a willing local municipal council, and

3) a willing landowner, which may be either a municipality or private landowner (in conjunction with municipalities) prepared to sell his or her land to Metro.

*If the nominated site is located on provincial crown land or in areas without municipal organization, a resolution is required from neighbouring municipalities as may be deemed appropriate by the provincial government (4).

According to the Draft Environmental Assessment Proposal: A Guideline for Public Sector Waste Management Planning (MOE-EA Branch, February, 1993) the willing host site is where "the owner is willing to sell their property for the purpose of landfill development and the host municipality is supportive of the proposal".(5)

1. The Host Region

Clearly, the host needs to be a municipal government in conjunction with an interested landowner. The Adams mine site is in Boston Township, an unorganized municipality. There is an interested landowner, Notre Development, but no level of municipal government exists in Boston Township itself. In the case of the Adams mine site, the host region was defined arbitrarily by the proponent/landowner, Notre Development.(6) Notre Development designated the councils of Kirkland Lake, Larder Lake and Englehart as potential willing hosts.

The rationale provided was that those communities constituted the catchment area for the miners formerly employed at the Adams mine. According to Notre Development, "...after a review of the historical effects of the Adams mine on the economy and social aspects of the area..."(7), Kirkland Lake, Larder Lake and Englehart were chosen as potential willing hosts and the councils agreed. Although it is clear that the laid-off miners were affected by the closure of the mine, it is not as clear how they would be affected by the opening of a landfill more than any other sector of the regional population. This is an inappropiate criterion to determine a host region.

Proximity to the site, a reasonable indicator of whether a community may or may not be affected by a landfill, also fails to justify the selection of the three communities invited to sign the host agreement with Metro Toronto. There were organized communities within that area that were excluded from the host region agreement. There are also communities along the Highway 11 corridor that could be affected, either positively or negatively, by increased rail traffic. As well, the communities that share the watershed with the Adams Mine site are also potentially affected.

The Adams Mine host region raises the possibility of one jurisdiction acting on behalf of another location some distance away. Under the definition put forward by Metro, clearly Kirkland Lake, with jurisdiction for solid waste management in the Boston Creek area, meets at least one criterion. It is difficult to determine why Larder Lake and Englehart are included in the host region.

The willing host situation is complicated in the Adams Mine landfill proposal by the fact that the site itself is in an unorganized township. Notre contacted the Province (who is required to act on behalf of the unorganized townships) in 1990 requesting provincial endorsement of the Adams mine site as "one of Metropolitan Toronto's contingency landfill site nomination". The Ministry of Northern Development and Mines responded it could not 'endorse' the site but felt that "the demonstrated support from the willing host for purposes of the GTA nomination have been met." (8)

Accordingly to Notre Development, the Province will be acting on behalf of the township during the EA Hearings:

Under the EA process in Ontario, all government Ministries will review the technical and environmental studies being completed by Metro as part of the Environmental Protection Agency requirements to the Board hearing. In effect the Government will be conducting a detailed "peer review" on the merits of the project, "on behalf of the residents of the unorganized townships".(9)

This is not the case. The Province's responsibility cannot be simply to one group of people. They must instead act on behalf of the people of Ontario. It is quite possible that the interests of Boston Township are not compatible with the interests of the people of Ontario.

It seems clear that the Province cannot be a willing host. Since the Province must act, as it were, as the landlord of the property as well as the final adjudicator in the Environmental Process, a conflict of interest is present. The question of who speaks politically for the Township needs to be addressed, because it cannot be the Province. Perhaps a local service board, or a taxpayers association could represent the Township, and thus speak to whether the township is willing or not. As will be pointed out later, the Boston Creek/Round Lake Taxpayers Association are overwhelmingly opposed to the project.

There needs to be clear guidelines for municipalities under these circumstances.

2. Willingness

There is a significant degree of ambiguity in the determination of a community's willingness to host a landfill. Metro Toronto's definition, as given in their site search document, is simply self-defined, i.e. willing means willing. Metro required interested municipalities to pass resolutions stating "it is a Willing Host or at least prepared to allow environmental assessment activities, including public consultation, to take place within its border..." (10).

According to Jane Peatch, Special Assistant to Allan Tonks (MetroWorks), the position of the municipal councils was the 'only acid test' they had for willingess. (12). This is also the position of Notre: "...a willing host must be the decisions of local councils"(13). But in the case of the Adams Mine landfill proposal, there has been ample evidence to indicate that the communities both within the designated three "host communities" and in surrounding areas are not willing. The residents of Boston Townships, the actual site area, have clearly indicated their unwillingness.

In MetroWorks " Strategy to Undertake a Willing Host landfill site search in compliance with EAA requirements" (14), they claimed that equity and social fairness could not be addressed in a systematic landfill site search. The document, prepared by Senes Consultants, goes on to claim that this selection process "ensures that the community which will accept the landfill site supports the siting of this facility and receives benefits for accepting society's burden".(15)

If the concern is acceptability to the community, then there must be a method of testing willingness. Derek Doyle, Director EA branch in 1993 pointed out, "...We would have serious concerns with any siting process that simply assesses willingness based on concurrence of an appropriate municipal council and a landowner who is willing to sell land. We suggest that your team consider incorporating willingness or community concurrence in a progressive fashion by increasing the precision of the social "indicators" as you proceed from screening steps to comparative evaluations."(16) This has not happened.

The confusion that exists around how to determine willingness has left the communities of Temiskaming frustrated. As will be noted below, many communities in the region, both at the level of municipal government and citizen's groups, have taken measures to demonstrate their unwillingness. In the site selection initiated by Metro, however, there was never any adequate response to guide communities on this issue.

Outstanding questions remain: how does one confirm willingness and what process is there to monitor willingness? It is quite probable that at various stages of public consultation, a communities' position might change. As technical information comes to light a community that was initially willing might decide this is unacceptable.

Early in the process, the communities of Englehart and Larder Lake stated that their willingness was contingent not just on safe, technical reports but also on the conditions that there was a long-term commitment and a re-cycling facility (17). Now that Notre Development is considering a short-term agreement with Metro, or may be unable to afford the significant re-cycling component originally promised by Metro, are we to assume that Larder and Englehart are no longer willing?

The citizens of Kirkland Lake originally supported the proposal that the landfill project go to a full EA hearing. But they believed at that time they would have the chance to express their willingness via a referendum sometime in the future, as made clear by this August 9, 1995 editorial in the Kirkland Lake Gazette:

"Kirkland Lake's vote in favour of an environmental assessment didn't mean a majority of residents want the development to become a reality. Some voted for the assessment simply out of fear that the project might proceed as an emergency interim site, without benefit of a full environmental assessment.

"Despite repeated assurances that they'd have a vote on whether the project proceeds, residents here are no closer to having that long promised referendum.

"Nearly 18 months ago, town councillors rejected a proposal to hold a referendum after the completion of an environmental assessment. Last month they voted against holding one before an assessment gets under way."(18)

This is precisely the situation that the EA Branch suggested could be avoided if other social indicators had been factored in to assist in the determination of willingness. If residents of Kirkland Lake expressed willingness conditional on certain reassurances which were then not forthcoming, are they bound by their initial willingness? As well, in the interests of the proponent, at what point, after investing substantial amounts of money, can the proponent be assured that the willingness of the community won't change? There is simply too much confusion for this to be a viable site selection process.

3. The Willing Host Status of the Adams Mine landfill proposal

The three councils of Kirkland Lake, Larder Lake and Englehart passed resolutions indicating that they were willing host communities. Since that time, however, a number of events have transpired which cast serious doubt on their claims to represent the wishes of their constituents. At the expense of considerable civic energy, a number of communities have attempted to demonstrate clearly their status as unwilling. A series of referendums and polls were conducted in numerous communities. (see Plate 1)

For example: citizens of the "willing host" community of Larder Lake went door-to-door. 546 individuals were polled (about 73% of registered electors) and of those 402 said they were opposed to the garbage plan. Citizens have been pressuring their council to reverse their willing host status to reflect the wishes of the community. The council finally conceeded to draft a letter to Metro Toronto stating that the residents of Larder Lake are not willing hosts. (19)

Round Lake/Boston Creek, the community surrounding the actual site of the landfill, held their own referendum. 95% of the residents voted against the proposed landfill.

As well, the Temiskaming Municipal Association voted 15-3 in favour of requesting the Adams Mine site to be removed from Metro's short-list of options.

C. The Export of Garbage Outside the Source Jurisdiction

It should be made clear that the position of the residents of Temiskaming cannot be dismissed as predictable NIMBYism.

Two factors distinguish the Adams Mine landfill situation from other siting processes.

1) It is a case of three jurisdictions agreeing to the dumping of waste in another area. It is not in their own backyard but someone else's.

2) It involves the importation of garbage from outside of the area. Unlike situations where a community is attempting to site a landfill and the residents all refuse to have it near their neighbourhood, Boston Township, and the larger region of Temiskaming, are being asked to accept garbage from other, larger, municipalities. (As it stands now, Notre has stated they will solicit garbage from throughout the province, not just Metro).(20)

There needs to be some examination about the exporting of garbage beyond a municipality's jurisdiction.

As the feasibility of siting disposal facilities anywhere continues to diminish, the public and private waste managers are experiencing severe difficulties finding landfills and have adopted a strategy of identifying powerless, economically depressed communities which can be manipulated into becoming waste dumping grounds. (21)

The export of garbage poses technical as well as philosophical/moral concerns. The implications of allowing communities to site landfills far from the source where the waste is generated inevitably leads to an out of sight, out of mind attitude. Responsible waste management should promote the 3R's, not undermine them.

If garbage is to be exported, then clearly the notion of a willing host is critical to a fair siting process. However, until workable criterion are established, the willing host selection process is not valid. Many citizens in the 'host region' agreed to willing host status assuming a favourable EA. They can only become willing host communities, then, after the fact.

Recently, Notre Development made it clear that the concept of willing host was no longer an issue now that they were pursuing the project privately. Then on what basis can the Adams Mine site be legitimately brought forward to an EA hearing?

D. Alternative sites

Unfortunately there was no legitimate consideration of any alternative sites included in the selection process. Initially the Adams Mine site was compared to a site that had been considered under the Interim Waste Authority, namely Site V4A. However, it was essentially a straw-man comparison as the site was never considered a potential alternative. As Brian Gallaugher, part of the peer review team, pointed out, the " ... Adams mine site should be compared with a viable site that Metro may realistically have an opportunity to use." (22) Gartner Lee echoed this concern: "...we understand that these documents were developed to support an EA application. However, there were few instances where alternative methods are developed and evaluated to identify a preferred alternative."

According to the "Revised Metro Toronto Willing Host Landfill Site Search" document prepared for MetroWorks, Phase 2 of the willing host site search identified 10 willing host sites. Senes comments that "...details of this search have never been released."(23) If the primary site criterion was willing host, it would be useful for the public to be able to compare these other sites.

Derek Doyle , Director, Environmental Assessment Branch, confirmed the EA Branch's commitment to comparative site selection: "Using the "willing host" would be appropriate in unique situations where a proponent can demonstrate that no suitable siting opportunities exist within its own jurisdiction. In such a situation, we believe that certain principles must be maintained. It is essential that other aspects of the environment (e.g. biophysical) are not compromised and that a reasonable range of siting alternatives is considered. Any process under the EA Act should demonstrate that a reasonable number of sites were considered and examined based on the full scope of the environment, and that the preferred site based on accepted criteria is chosen."(24)

Clearly, the Adams Mine site selection process did not include the consideration of a reasonable number of sites. Even though at times comparison was made to the V4A site, Notre is very clear in their response to peer review comments that "... comparison to the IWA site is not part of Notre's application." (25) The application does not meet the basic and "essential" EA requirements.

Given that the Adams mine was brought forward as a preferred site under a Willing host Landfill search, and given the lack of clarity of the willing host site selection process, as well as the clear public opposition to plan throughout the region, it is our position that the selection does not represent a valid process for responsible site selection.

As well, given that it is now the position of the proponent that the "willing host is not an issue" then the site selection criteria that indicated the Adams mine may be a preferred site has been abandoned. The Adams Mine does not meet any of the basic EA requirements that a "... preferred site based on accepted criteria is chosen."

Notes for Site Selection Process

1. David Ramsay, quoted in the Timiskaming Speaker, June 26, 1995. pg.1

2. MetroWorks, Adams Mine Site Assessment Project: Fact Sheet "Background and Description", April, 1995.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. from "Draft Environmental Assessment Proposal Proposal: A Guideline for Public Sector Waste Management Planning ". Ministry of Environment and Energy- EA Branch. February, 1993.

6. For a description of Notre's perspective on the designation of a willing host region see "Historical Background - Adams Mine Project - Kirkland Lake Ontario: "Willing Host Development" submitted to Chuck Paulter, Director EA Branch, July 31, 1995. pgs. 2 & 3.

7. Ibid. pg.2

8. see correspondence from Ministry of Northern Development and Mines: "Contingency Landfill Nomination- Former Adams Mine site, District of Timiskaming" Brock Smith, Deputy Minister to Mr. Bob Ferguson, MetroWorks.

9. see "Historical Development - Adams Mine Project - Kirkland Lake - Ontario: "Willing Host Development", pg. 4.

10. see correspondence from Mr. George Kelly, Director Solid Waste for MetroWorks to Derek Doyle, EA Branch, Aug. 20, 1993.

11 Press Release, Statement by David Ramsay, MPP, Thursday, August 10, 1995,

Kirkland Lake.

12. from telephone interview with researcher.

13. "Historical Development - Adams Mine Project" Notre Development.

14. "Revised Metro Toronto Willing Host Landfill Site Search" . Prepared for Metro Works by Senes Consultants. June 1993. Part 4. pg. 13

15. Ibid.

16. correspondence from Mr. Derek Doyle, Director, EA Branch to Mr. George Kelly, Director- Solid Waste Management -MetroWorks. November 30, 1993.

17. "Recycling is an Economic Opportunity" 1st Newsletter from the Central Temiskaming Economic Development Corporation, Englehart.

18. Editorial, Kirkland Lake Gazette, August 9, 1995. See also coverage of threatened law-suit between Kirkland Lake Mayor, Mr. Mavrinac, and Temiskaming MPP David Ramsay: "Biggest Fraud" Friday August 11, 1995; "MPP faces lawsuit threat" Monday, September 11, 1995, pg 1; "Mavrinac Suing Ramsay" Wednesday, September 13, 1995, pg. 1.

19. "Larder bucks garbage plan" by Walter Franczyk, Kirkland Lake Gazette, August 30, 1995, p.1;

19. "Larder grapples with opposition to garbage" Kirkland Lake Gazette, September 27, 1995, pg.3; "Trash tops ballot" by David Dolejsi, Northern Daily News, July 25, 1995, pg.1; "Timiskaming says "No" to garbage" by Joe O'Grady, Northern Daily News, Friday, June 14, 1995, pg.1.

20.. Information relating to Notre's intention to solicit garbage province-wide from telephone conversation with Gordon McGuinty.

21. Crooks, Harold. "Fighting Off Export: The Challenge of Planning and Financing the 3R's", A Review of the Greater Toronto Area 3Rs Analysis. prepared for It's Not Garbage Coalition, August, 1994.

22.. see Minutes of PLC Meeting, November 27, 1995.

23... see "Revised Metro Toronto Willing Host Landfill Site Search", June, 1993. p.3

24. see correspondence from Mr. Derek Doyle, Director, EA Branch to Mr. George Kelly, Solid Waste Management, MetroWorks, November 30, 1993.

25. see Adams Mine Site Assessment - Responses to Peer Review and Public Comments. Draft Technical Studies and Overview Document. Senes Consultants and Golder Associates Ltd. Section B-69.

Chapter 5: Other Issues

Summary: Since the outset, the consultation process has been rocked with controversy and frustration. There have been many criticisms regarding the flow of information, the amount of time allowed for peer review, and the quality of the information provided to the Public Liason Committee.

Since Metro has withdrawn from the process, circumstances have gone from bad to worse. The Public Liason Committee was dissolved and a small committee seleceted by Notre Development was created. The meetings of this committee are closed to both the press and public. The process is now seriously restricted and exclusive.

A. Consultation Process

1. Public consultation process - Metro Phase

The first controversy to erupt in the public consultation process was Metro's decision not to recognize a number of community representatives who sought a place on the Public Liaison (PLC). The individuals represented communities who were interested and believed they could be affected by the landfill proposal. These were from farming communities to the south of the site. Other representatives represented environmental groups with a proven history with the landfill issue. Don Wright, a retired civil servant representing the township of Ingram, commented when he was told to leave the PLC table: "My people are not represented. The only people represented here are the people for Metro Toronto." (3)

At the first PLC meeting, Metro officials had police intervene to remove some community representatives from the table. The solution ultimately proposed by Metro was the creation of a Regional Consultation Forum to include some of the groups who requested a seat on the PLC. (4) But the RCF also got off to a rocky start. Numerous delays on the selection of participants bogged the RCF down. Brennain Lloyd of Northwatch (North Bay) maintained that the RCF seemed to be created as a "disposal site" for groups that Metro would not include on the PLC. The representative of the Temiskaming Municipal Association, Mr. Paul Bogart, missed the first two meetings because he had not even been notified about the meetings. (5)

The Algonquin Nation Secretariat Grand Chief Harry St. Denis informed Metro Toronto that it had an interest in the Adams Mine landfill proposal. According to Grand Chief Harry St. Denis, "We haven't been consulted. I don't know if its because we are on the Quebec side." He went on to comment that all interested parties to the project are supposed to be consulted. ((7) Metro responded that the Algonquin interests could be included in Phase 2 of the studies. However, there was no Phase 2 and Notre moved to restrict the consultation area to the Adams mine road, Boston Creek area. This clearly excludes the Algonquin Nation which was in the process of land claim investigations in the area of the Adams Mine.

2. Public consultation - Notre Development

To comply with requirements of the MOEE, Notre undertook its own public consultation process when Metro Toronto backed out of a publicly sponsored landfill proposal. According to Notre, there are six components to their Public Consultation Plan.(9) The first is the Adams Mine Advisory Working Group to consist of around five people. The participants must come from a very small area directly around the actual site. Marlo Johnson, of Notre Development, stated that the group had a hard time finding people willing to sit on it(10). Helen Olsen, a former member of the PLC and a resident of the Adam's mine road, says most people are "fed-up with the whole process."(11)

These meetings are closed to the public and to the press. Unlike the former public consultation process, minutes of the meetings are only available at libraries in the north end of the region or the mine site itself. Both are highly inconvenient for anyone in the south end of the district to get to. There is a very restricted flow of information.

The second component is the Peer Review Process committee. These meetings will review the technical issues. They too are closed to the public and the press. The Regional Municipalities Working Group, the third component, consists only of the three municipalities originally involved in the host agreement. Despite significant interest in the other municipalities in the district, none of them are included.

The fourth avenue for consultation, the open houses, are held at the site. This is highly inconvenient. Usually only one technical person is one site to answer questions. Technical document are available for review but it is impossible to go through under such constrained time conditions. Copies of the reports are available only for a fee. This severely impedes public review of the technical work. The last two components, meeting with site neighbours and other interested parties, has not gone all that smoothly. The TFA has been requesting a meeting with Notre Development Since -- and finally had to request one publicly during a press conference in August.

B. Peer Review Process

"The SENES reports appear to follow the adversarial approach frequently followed by landfill applicants and their consultants seeking approval in a quasi-judicial setting. Information favourable to the proposal is presented, leaving it up to the public to provide the information necessary to develop a more balanced assessment of the situation. The siutation is strongly contrary to public health, trhe environment and the credibility of the consulting engineering and technical professions." -Dr. Fred Lee

Given the volume of technical reports presented to both the peer reviewers and the PLC, adequate time is essential to provide a comprehensive review. However, there were numerous complaints that the material was not delivered in a timely fashion and that the turn around time was too short. Throughout the Metro's public consultation process there were numerous complaints that the technical reports were slow in getting to the committee. Dale Alexander, PLC representative for the Prospectors and Developers Association, commented:

"I have found it impossible to complete a rigorous assessment of the attachments due to time restrictions".

Gartner Lee, the other peer review consultant, also expressed frustration that the reports often did not include enough supporting detail to enable reviewers to assess the reliability of the conclusions. (14)

Participants on the PLC also felt they did not have enough time with the reports. There were also criticism concerning the quality of the consultants reports. As Mr. Joe Muething, PLC representative for the northern sub-committee, said:

"My impression, overall, was that this entire study was rushed. Figures don't agree with charts, which don't agree with maps. Conclusions are reached without the sort of detailed explanations I would expect. I realize that this is a draft report, but I would expect even a draft copy of a scientific report to accurately document the data gathered in the field. When figures don't correspond, which one do we use, and how confident can we be that the original data was copied correctly?"(15)

The transition from a publicly-driven process to a private one had a definite impact on the flow of information. Recommendations for further study in "Phase 2" were difficult to follow-up on, given that strictly speaking, there was no Phase 2. Most important, as Brian Gallaugher pointed out only the peer review comments that Metro's consultants agree with or are a matter of clarification will be part of the final drafts of the reports. Comments they don't agree with will be left for later. these interim reports. However, given the shift in process, this further discussion with peer reviewers never had a chance to occur. When Notre took the reins over from Metro, there was no more PLC or peer reviewers. The time and energy the citizens put into the PLC was effectively scuttled as there was no formal opportunity for any follow-up.

Residents in the area were so frustrated they eventually organized their own open house so that information could be shared. According to Mr. Joe Muething, a former PLC member, the open house hoped to increase the flow of information to the public. As Mr. Muething said, it is important that ".. people can get both sides of the story."

Section V - Notes

1. Elizabeth Denton, Public heath nurse, northern sub-committee representitive PLC, Tuesday, June 30, 1995. Northern Daily News.

2. John Vanthof, Temiskaming Federation of Agriculture rep. on PLC. from June 12, 1995 PLC Metting, Kirkland Lake.

3.Don Wright, Ingram Township, June 12, PLC meeting, Kirkland Lake.

4 Darlene Wroe. "Regional Consultation Forum Metting Discussions heated" Temiskaming Spealer. Wednesday, September 27, 1995. pg. 6a.

5 Ibid.

6. Temiskaing Speaker. Wednesday, November 8, 1995.

7. Ibid.

8. Notre Development Corporation "Adams Mine Landfill Assessment: 1996 Public Consultation Plan" pg. 8.

9. Based on comments with researcher at Notre Development Open House, August 12, 1995.

10. Based on telephone interview with Ms. Helen Olsen.

11. Correspondence from Dr. Fred Lee to Martha McSherry (REEPA) July 3, 1995. pg.1.

12.Correspondence from Dr. Fred Lee to Martha McSherry, July 3, 1995. pg,2.

13. Comments from Mr. Dale Alexander, Prospectors and Developers (PLC) to Mr. Joe Muething, Northern sub-committee (PLC) re: Appendix F November 27, 1995.

14. see comments also by Brian Gallaugher, Peer Review Team, November 27, 1995; also Gartner Lee, review of Appendix B, cover page.

15. Comments by Mr. Joe Muething, northern sub-committee, (PLC) Comments on Draft Appendix F. November 27, 1995.

16. Dr. Fred Lee, Comments on Draft Reports. November 13, 1995. pg.3.