A Quick and Dirty History of the Adams Mine
by Charlie Angus
HighGrader Magazine Summer 2000
As a site, the Adams Mine is hardly what you'd look for in an ideal landfill. The site has three large massive pits sunk in badly fractured rock. The main pit is 55 storeys deep and breaks through the water table at numerous levels. The mine sits atop the height of land, overlooking the rich Temiskaming farm belt.
When the mine closed in the late 1980s, North Bay businessman Gordon McGuinty picked up an option on the site from the owners, Dofasco.
McGuinty's company, Notre Development, then set out to hawk the site to the City of Toronto. The plan was to have the City pay for and maintain the site, while Notre would get a generous cut as the go-between.
Local opposition to the plan was immediate. But McGuinty sold the idea to the town councils of Kirkland Lake, Larder Lake and Englehart, even though the site, in an unorganized township, wasn't under any of their jurisdictions.
The plan came to grinding halt in 1990, when the new NDP government brought in Bill 143 which stopped rich cities like Toronto from dumping on poorer outlying regions.
Undaunted, McGuinty continued to work behind the scenes. Prior to the 1995 election, McGuinty met his golfing pal Conservative leader Mike Harris for a meeting at a Toronto restaurant with then Kirkland Lake Mayor Joe Mavrinac, Toronto Councillor Joan King and then head of Public Works, Rob Ferguson. The subject for discussion? Kick starting the garbage train.
The 1995 conservative landslide was the answer to his prayers. Being a hometown pal to the Premier certainly enhanced McGuinty's chances.

Hot Summer of Discontent
In early 1995, the NDP were history and Metro Works was back in the north (see Waking the Sleeping Giant HighGrader July 1995). As part of their prep work leading up to an Environmental Assessment, Metro Works set up a local steering body -the Public Liaison Committee (PLC).
As the proceedings wore on, it was becoming increasingly apparent that fundamental questions about the site were not being answered. Opposition was boiling over across the region.
Among the first opponents were former miners. They pointed out that the pit contained numerous fractures and that water levels fluctuated greatly over the various levels of the mine.
McGuinty's plan called for a process of "hydraulic containment". The theory being that as long as water was flowing in through the numerous cracks and fissures, leachate would not flow out.
McGuinty's team based their conjectures on a series of computer models, while the PLC relied on the testimony of a California-based hydrology expert Dr. Fred Lee. He trashed the modelling and warned residents to actively oppose the plan (see How Safe? page 15).
Despite the less than rosy results of the PLC hearings, McGuinty's plan went to City Council in late 1995. Much to everyone's surprise the deal was tossed out. The cost to build and maintain the site was too pricey.
Metro Works had already sunk $4.3 million into the scheme and had promised Notre Development monthly payments of between $75,000 and $150,000 a month for the next five years.
Council scrapped the deal and opted for a cheaper site in Michigan.
But McGuinty had friends in high places. Hoping to force Council to take the North Bay bid, the Province tried to stop the Michigan deal by bringing in a law to force Toronto to conduct Environmental Assessments on sites which were already up and running in Michigan.
City Council moved fast and before the new law was enacted, they signed their deal with Michigan. Once again McGuinty was left in the wilderness.

Five More Years
After losing the Metro Works gravy train, McGuinty went in search of private backers. He found them: Waste Management Inc., the Miller Group, some private investors, as well as the Ontario Northland Railway.
He then set out to overcome the next massive hurdle the EA.
From the beginning, opponents believed the site would never stand up to the scrutiny of a full assessment.
Temiskaming MPP David Ramsay, speaking in 1995, summed up the feelings, "If this thing went before an EA it would be laughed out."
But under the Conservatives, major changes to the Environmental Assessment Act were brought in which limited public input, participation and above all the scope of the hearing.
As well, Notre's lawyer, Robert Power (see the Powers that Be March April 1998) had been busy making friends.
Rob Power was no stranger to the Adams Mine. A high powered Toronto lawyer, he was brought in to represent the so-called hosts -- Kirkland Lake, Larder Lake and Englehart. Metro Toronto even tried to get him installed as the lawyer for the independent PLC (they declined).
At one point, Power tried his hand at libel law. He wrote a libel threat on behalf of Mayor Joe Mavrinac who was locked in a mud-slinging war with dump opponent MPP David Ramsay (the suit went nowhere).
After the Tories took office, Power was chosen to co-chair a special advisory team to the Minister of Environment. The subject at hand? Changes to the Environmental Assessment Act.
Since the minutes of the PAC (Policy Advisory Committee) are secret, it is impossible to assess the impact this input may, or may not, have had. But nonetheless, shortly after the EA was rewritten, Rob Power was the first lawyer to test the waters.
Even before the hearing was held, critics were claiming the new changes seem perfectly designed to fast track the project. But even so, the Adams Mine barely scraped through. Despite a scoped hearing, which limited testimony and focused on a few technical questions, the Adams Mine EA ended up with a split decision and a far-from clear result.
As for Rob Power? Right after the hearing, the Tories handed him the prestigious job as head of the prestigious Trillium Foundation. Critics said he was being sent in to turn the Trillium into a Tory safe haven. All things considered, it was a pretty plum job for a dump lawyer.

This article may be reprinted for personal use but any reprints requires prior permission of HighGrader Magazine.

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